Under-investment in state capacity: the role of inequality and political instability by Mauricio Cárdenas & Didem Tuzemen
 
Under-Investment in State 
Capacity: The Role of 
Inequality and Political 
Instability 
 
Mauricio Cárdenas and Didem Tuzemen 
December 2011 
RWP 11-07 Under-Investment in State Capacity:
The Role of Inequality and Political Instability
Mauricio C ardenasy and Didem Tuzemenz
First Draft: September 6, 2010
Current Draft: October 17, 2011
Abstract
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scal capacity, is positively
related to economic development. In this paper, we analyze the determinants of the government's
decision to invest in state capacity, which involves a trade-o between present consumption and the
ability to collect more taxes in the future. Using a model, we highlight some political and economic
dimensions of this decision and conclude that political stability, democracy, income inequality, as well
as the valuation of public goods relative to private goods, are important variables to consider. We then
test the main predictions of the model using cross-country data and nd that state capacity is higher
in more stable and equal societies, both in economic and political terms, and in countries where the
chances of ghting an external war are high, which is a proxy for the value of public goods.
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11 Introduction
The most commonly known and the earliest denition of state capacity is the state's power to raise tax
revenues. As documented in Acemoglu (2005) and Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2010), tax revenues
constitute only a small portion of GDP in developing countries, such as those in Latin America, Asia
and sub-Saharan Africa. The important consequence of the state's inability to collect taxes is the limited
provision of public goods and services, which are crucial for the well-being and the living standards of
its citizens, especially those of the poor. If level of economic development and welfare of a country are
closely related to state capacity, it is critical to understand why certain countries have a low-state-capacity
problem. What are the main determinants of the level of state capacity? When do governments under-
invest in state capacity? These are the main questions we aim to answer in this paper.
We present a two-period and two-group political economy model based on the theoretical framework
developed in Besley and Persson (2009). We name the two groups as elites and citizens, assuming the
elites to be the minority group. In each period, the group holding the political power chooses its policy
vector of taxes, spending in public goods, and the level of investment in state capacity. The maximum
tax rate is determined by the level of state capacity, which can be increased with costly investments by
the government. We associate political inequality to autocratic political systems. Specically, in a fully
democratic political system, the utility weights are equal to the population shares. We assume that the
system is politically unequal when the utility of a particular group is weighted disproportionately. We also
allow for political instability, and assume that the political system is unstable if the ruling group is likely
to lose political power to the opponent group, which can occur, for example, as a result of a civil war.
We rst investigate how incidence and risk of external wars, as well as political inequality and stability,
shape the government's decision to invest in state capacity. Then, we include income inequality to analyze
its eect on the investment decision.
Our main theoretical results indicate that the eects of external and civil wars go in opposite directions.
While the future risk of ghting external wars calls for building stronger state capacity, ghting civil wars
(which is a measure of political instability) causes the government to invest less in state capacity. In the
case of an external war, it is the government's best interest to invest in state capacity, to be able to tax
both groups at the maximum possible rate, and use these resources to increase spending in public goods
(e.g., defense). However, if the country is ghting a civil war, the political system is highly unstable. In
this case, the government's actions are myopic, so the future benet of having higher state capacity stock
is low. Therefore, political instability (proxied with incidence of civil wars, or with the likelihood that
2the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means) leads to lower
investment in state capacity. In the case of political inequality, our model predicts that more democratic
political systems (lower political inequality) invest more in state capacity. Furthermore, all these results
are independent of which group holds the political power.
When we allow for income inequality, the investment decision becomes group-specic. More precisely,
when the elites are in power, in the presence of political instability, both income and political inequality
lead to lower investment in state capacity. Conversely, if the citizens are the rulers, our theory predicts
that the combination of high political and income inequality results in higher state capacity. However,
this is not always the case. Under some circumstances, inequality can result in low investment in state
capacity, rationalizing the failed social revolutions.
We empirically test the model's main predictions by applying econometric methods on cross-sectional data.
We use several dierent measures to proxy for state capacity, which cover dierent and complementary
aspects, ranging from scal to bureaucratic dimensions. Our empirical results support the theoretical
predictions. We nd that higher incidence of external wars and political stability (lower incidence of civil
wars or lower likelihood that the government will be destabilized) are associated with higher state capacity.
On the contrary, inequality (political and/or income) is negatively correlated with state capacity. We also
consider the interactions of income inequality with political stability and democracy. The estimation results
indicate that, when there is income inequality, the magnitudes of the positive correlations of democracy
and political stability with state capacity are signicantly reduced.
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 introduces
the model and discusses the theoretical results. In Section 4, we explain in detail the data we use, present
the empirical evidence and discuss the regression results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our study is related to three strands of literature. The rst strand focuses on the eects of wars on
formation and development of state capacity. In one of the earliest studies in this line, Tilly (1990)
argues that international wars cause governments to build and invest in state capacity. In order to ght
wars, governments need to raise military expenditures, for which more tax revenues have to be collected.
The experiences of countries like Britain and the United States support this view, since these countries
strengthened their tax systems during the rst and the second World Wars.
3While external wars have drawn attention for building stronger states, it is misleading to extend the
argument for the case of internal wars, or civil wars.1 Consider, for example, Latin American countries,
where external wars have been rare, while civil wars have been common and long-lasting. Yet, there has
been limited investment in state capacity. Among others, Centeno (2002) argues that state capacity has
remained low in Latin America, because civil wars have been highly destructive. Besley and Persson (2008)
nd evidence that this result is not limited to Latin America, but can be extended as a general consequence
of civil wars.
In line with this literature, we consider the eects of wars on shaping the government's decision to invest
in state capacity. Yet, we argue that incidence of wars are not the only causes of state capacity dierences
across countries. There is also a strong negative relationship between state capacity and levels of political
and income inequality. In order to fully grasp the low-state-capacity problem, we revisit inequality both
theoretically and empirically.
Political and development economists have studied the links between income and political inequality and
level of economic development and growth, extensively. Some important examples are Alesina and Rodrik
(1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Barro (2000) on income inequality; Acemoglu and Robinson
(2000), Persson and Tabellini (2006), and Acemoglu (2005, 2006) on political inequality. Yet, the rela-
tionship between inequality and state capacity is not well documented. Our work lls this important gap
in the literature by studying the eects of political and income inequality on the government's decision to
invest in state capacity. Moreover, we present a unied theoretical framework, where the interactions of
the two inequality measures can be analyzed.
Lastly, our work contributes to the literature on institutions. Earlier studies, such as Knack and Keefer
(1995), Hall and Jones (1999) and Engerman and Sokolo (2000), present strong empirical evidence on the
positive eect of institutional quality on economic growth, development and wealth of countries. Moreover,
they nd that institutions persist. But, why do economic institutions dier across countries and why do
they persist? One important explanation is provided by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), who
nd that colonial origins are important elements that lead to the exogenous dierences between economic
institutions. Our paper complements their study by treating institutions as endogenous and analyzing the
conditions that lead to persistently low investment in state capacity.
Our paper is closely linked to and builds on the recent work by Besley and Persson (2009), who develop a
framework where the policy choices in market regulation and taxation are constrained by state capacity, as
1See Blattman and Miguel (2010) for an extensive literature survey on the causes and consequences of civil wars.
4well as the economic institutions inherited from the past. They analyze the economic and political deter-
minants of the government's choice to invest in building legal and scal state capacity. Their results show
that ghting external wars, political stability and inclusive political institutions are central for building
state capacity. Moreover, they nd that legal and scal capacity are complements.
The important dierences between this paper and Besley and Persson (2009) are as follows. First, we
restrict the denition of state capacity to scal capacity. This enables us to analyze the interactions between
political and income inequality in a simpler framework. Second, while they focus on the complementarity
and the substitutability between scal and legal capacity of the state, our main aim is to analyze the
individual and combined eects of democracy, income inequality and political stability on state capacity.
Third, we present a more detailed comparison between the investment decision and the eects of the
determinants of state capacity when the government is run by dierent income groups (elites and citizens).
This is important, because low state capacity is a feature of many failed social revolutions.
3 Theoretical Model and Simulations
3.1 Model
As we mentioned previously, our model follows closely the model in Besley and Persson (2009). Time is
discrete and consists of two periods, s = 1, 2. There are two groups of agents in the economy, J = A, B.
In each period, one group, say group A, holds the political power (becomes the government), and makes
the taxation and government spending decisions. Groups dier in their population shares A and B, and
may also dier in their per capita income levels Y A and Y B. Total population is normalized to unity.
Agents in the same group have the same preferences and income levels. All agents derive utility from
consuming private goods that they purchase with their after-tax income and public goods provided by the
government.
We let tax rates to be group-specic tA
s and tB
s , and allow them to take negative values in order to make full
redistribution possible. The maximum tax rate is determined by the stock of state capacity in each period.
As in Besley and Persson (2009), we assume that the capacity to tax depends on the previous investments
in building institutions, such as administrations like the Internal Revenue Service in the United States,
which manages and monitors taxation. The government takes the stock of the rst period state capacity
1 as given and decides the level of investment in state capacity 4 = 2   1, which determines the level
of state capacity in the second period. The stock of state capacity does not depreciate, but in order to
have a higher level of state capacity in the second period, the government needs to make a non-negative
5investment in the rst period.2 The cost of investment takes a functional form F(4), which is increasing
and strictly convex in the level of investment 4, and has the properties F(0) = F0(0) = 0. Investment in
state capacity is part of the government spending, and takes place only in the rst period, since the world
ends at the end of the second period.
The government also uses its resources to provide public goods Gs, from which both groups benet. The
value given to public goods in the utility function is denoted by s, which is a continuous random variable
with c.d.f H and p.d.f h on the interval [0;], where   1. In order to illustrate the stochastic valuation
assumption, let's consider defense as an example of a public good. If a country engages in an external war,
defense becomes very valuable, and it is optimal for the government to increase military spending. In the
absence of such a conict, defense is valued less, and the government spends less or no resources for the
provision of this public good.
The General Problem
Next, we set up the optimization problem of the group in power, or the government, in each period. Here
is the timing of events:
1. Nature determines the value of public goods s and which group (A) holds the political control.
2. The government picks its policy vector of taxes tJ
s, spending in public goods Gs and the level of
investment in state capacity 4.
3. Agents consume.
Assuming that preferences are linear in private consumption and public goods provision, the indirect utility







= sGs + (1   tJ
s)Y J (1)
The government chooses the policy vectors that maximize the sum of the weighted utilities of the two
groups. In the case of a utilitarian government, or a fully democratic political system, the weights should
be equal to the population shares of the two groups. Yet, many countries do not have fully democratic
systems, but rather function on partial democracies, which imply some form of political inequality. In this
case, the weights are not equal to the population shares, instead they are the population shares multiplied
with two new parameters  and , which represent the political weights the government gives to each
group. Therefore, the total weight the group in power attaches to its own group becomes A, while that
2We assume that 4  0.
6for the opponent group becomes B. We say that the system is politically unequal if the group in power
favors its own group members, which corresponds to  > 1 and  < 1. From now on, we will assume that
  1 and   1, and dene our measure of political inequality as   =    . By assumption, the sum
of the weights attached to the groups' utilities should satisfy A + B = 1. Under a fully democratic
political system, there should be no political inequality, therefore, we should have   = 0. In this case, each
group's weight in the utility is equal to its share in the population, in other words, we have  =  = 1.
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1JY J = G1 + F(4) (4)
G1  0 and 1  tJ
1 (5)
where ENP stands for the second period Expected Net Payo for the group ruling in the rst period. This
is an expected payo because the outcome depends on which group holds power in the second period. In
what follows, we assume that the ruling group keeps political power in the second period with an exogenous
probability of . That is, a higher  means greater political stability.
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2JY J = G2 (8)
G2  0 and 2  tJ
2 (9)
As in the rst period maximization problem, the ruling group takes the value of public goods 2 and the
level of state capacity 2 as given, and chooses the optimal level of tax rates and public goods provision.
Before we move on to the results of the maximization problem, let's have a closer look at the indirect
utility that the government is maximizing in the second period. Substituting Equation (8) into Equation
(7) gives:

AY A + BY B
+ AtA
2 Y A(2   ) + BtB
2 Y B(2   ) (10)
Note that in order to maximize Equation (7) with the choice of any positive provision of public goods in
7the rst period, the condition 2   has to be satised.3 That is, public goods are provided only when
the value of public goods is greater than or equal to the value that the group in power assigns to its own
private consumption. Given the cumulative distribution of the stochastic variable 2, this event occurs
with probability [1   H()]. Conversely, when 2 < , the ruling group values public goods less than its
own private consumption and, hence, nds it optimal to set G = 0. This occurs with probability H(). To
summarize, the value attached to public goods determines whether the government provides public goods,
or not. If public goods are provided, then we name the state of the world as `Common Interest State'.
If no public goods are provided, then the state is called `Redistribution State', for the reasons that will
become clear once we lay out the maximization results.
Optimal Taxation and Public Goods Provision
Since the maximization problem of the government is linear in the policy variables, we can analyze the opti-
mal taxation and public goods provision decisions separately from the optimal investment in state capacity
decision. We rst present the optimal tax rates and public goods provision chosen by the government in
each state of the world.
If s  , then we are at the common interest state, which is observed with probability [1   H()]. In this
case, the optimal policy is:
tA
1 = 1; tB
1 = 1 (11)
tA
2 = 2; tB











Intuitively, since public goods are valued highly, the government taxes both groups at the maximum rate
and uses the collected resources for the provision of public goods in both periods and investment in state
capacity in the rst period.
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AY A ; tB
2 = 2 (16)
3Since   , this condition also guarantees that 2   holds.
8G1 = 0; G2 = 0 (17)
In this case, the value attached to public goods is low, therefore the group in power is only interested in
the redistribution of the resources. For this purpose, it taxes the opponent group at the maximum possible
rate and redistributes the tax revenues amongst its own group members.
Optimal Investment in State Capacity
In order to solve for the optimal investment level, we need to write down the second period Expected Net
Payo (ENP) in detail. The ruling group of the rst period is assumed to keep the political power in
the second period with probability , and lose it to the opponent group otherwise. For each case, we use
the optimal taxation and public goods provision results presented above to calculate the second period
expected payo for the rst period's ruling group. When the group continues to rule in the second period,
its expected payo is:
V 1




AY A + BY B
E f2j2  g +











Y A + B(1   2)Y B

(18)
The rst term on the right hand side stands for the sum of the weighted utilities of the two groups in the
common interest state, where both groups are taxed at the maximum amount, public goods are provided
and investment in state capacity takes place. The rst part presents the total utility derived by the two
groups from the provision of public goods. The second part is the sum of the after-tax income of the two
groups, weighted by the parameters chosen by the ruling group. The second term stands for the total
utility in the redistribution state, where the group in power taxes the opponent group at the maximum
rate, in order to redistribute the resources to its own members. No public goods are provided in this state.
The opponent group loses a share of its income due to taxation, whereas the group in power receives the
collected taxes and consumes more than its period income.
When the ruling group loses the political power to the opponent group, its expected payo becomes:
V 2




AY A + BY B
E f2j2  g +














The weights in this expected payo correspond to the values set by the rst period's ruling group, assuming
that it no longer runs the government in the second period. Note that the only dierence between Equation
(18) and Equation (19) is the last term. When the ruling group loses power to the opponent group, its
9members get taxed at the maximum rate and the new ruling group collects the tax revenues.
Now, we can dene the Expected Net Payo (ENP) as:
ENP = V 1
2 + (1   )V 2
2   (1)F(4) (20)
where (1) = maxf1;g is the Lagrange Multiplier associated with the government's budget constraint
in the rst period maximization problem. The sum of the rst two terms in the ENP corresponds to the
benet derived from investing in state capacity, whereas the last term is the cost of investment in terms
of the value of public funds. When we substitute in the payo values, the ENP becomes:
ENP = [1   H()]2

AY A + BY B
E f2j2  g + H()

AY A + BY B
+[1   H()](1   2)

AY A + BY B
+ H()2(   )

BY B   (1   )AY A
 (1)F(4) (21)
In order to determine the optimal level of investment, we go back to the rst period maximization problem
and write down the rst order condition with respect to 4, which corresponds to the derivative of the
ENP with respect to 4. We call the resulting optimality condition as `OPT equality', which is satised
at the optimal investment level.
OPT : (1)F0(4) = [1   H()]

AY A + BY B
E f2j2  g
 [1   H()]

AY A + BY B
+H()(   )

BY B   (1   )AY A
(22)
Equation (22) shows that the optimal level of investment in state capacity 4 depends on the main
parameters of the model, namely, 1, 2, and , as well as the level of inequality. In the next subsection,
we investigate the relationship between these variables and the investment decision.
3.2 Determinants of Investment in State Capacity
Predictions of the Benchmark Model
This section presents the eects of the key variables of the model on the state capacity investment decision
of the government. For this purpose, we begin with the above presented benchmark model, where we only
allow for political inequality. Later on, we will also introduce income inequality.
In the benchmark model, the two groups dier only in the population shares. We denote the variables
10related to the ruling group with the superscript A. We assume that the members of each group have the
same income levels, that is Y A = Y B = Y . When the elites are in power, we have A < B, while this
assumption changes to A > B when the citizens are in power. We say that there is political instability,
if the ruling group's probability of keeping the political power in the second period is less than or equal to
its population share   A. Lastly, we denote the level of political inequality with   =    . The results
to be presented in Propositions 1-4 do not depend on which group holds the political power.
Proposition 1. As the expected demand for public goods (or the future risk of an external conict)
increases, investment in state capacity increases as well.
Proof. A increase in the second period demand for public goods, or a rst order stochastically dom-
inating shift in 2, results in a higher value of E f2j2  g. To see the eect of this change on the




(1)F00(4), which is positive. 
Our rst result is very intuitive. When the government foresees that public goods will be more valuable
in the second period, it is optimal to increase the stock of state capacity, so that higher tax revenues can
be raised and more public goods can be provided. A good example of this case would be an increased
expectation of an external conict in the second period. In this case, the government would like to increase
military spending, which calls for building up the tax base in the rst period, in order to be able to collect
more resources from all groups in the second period.
Proposition 2. A higher current value of public goods (or a higher current threat of an external conict)
leads to lower investment in state capacity.






This result is exactly the opposite of the rst result, but the intuition is the same. If public goods are
valued highly in the rst period, then the government uses the collected resources immediately to increase
the public goods provision, which results in fewer resources left for investment in state capacity. An
example similar to the previous one would be the case where the country is involved in an external war in
the rst period. The military expenses become the government's priority, therefore, the collected resources
are used for the provision of this public good immediately.
Proposition 3. A higher level of political stability increases investment in state capacity.





which is positive. 
If the government is likely to be in power in the second period, then the incentive to expand the tax base
in the rst period is high. There is no discounting, therefore, it is the government's best interest to invest
in state capacity to be able to raise more tax revenues in the second period, which will lead to higher
public goods provision or redistribution. Therefore, investment in state capacity is higher in a more stable
political environment.
Proposition 4. In the presence of political instability, as political inequality increases, investment in state
capacity decreases.
Proof. See Appendix A.
If the group in power is likely to lose authority to the opponent group in the second period, then its rst
period actions are myopic. In addition, if the group also favors its own members, it values the redistribution
of the resources in the current period more than building a higher state capacity stock and raising higher
tax revenues in the second period. Therefore, regardless of which group holds the power, if there is political
instability, higher political inequality results in lower investment in state capacity. However, if the political
system is stable, that is if  > A, then higher political inequality may lead to higher investment in state
capacity. In other words, if the ruling group is highly likely to keep the political power in the second
period, it is optimal to expand the tax base in the rst period, to be able to raise higher taxes in the
second period. Note that, when the value of   increases, the probability of being in the redistribution
state H() also increases. A higher level of state capacity, or an expanded tax base, enables the ruling
group to tax the other group at a higher tax rate in the second period and redistribute higher tax revenues
amongst its own group members.
Predictions of the Benchmark Model with Income Inequality
Now, we introduce income inequality to our benchmark model. We continue to assume that all agents
in the same group have the same income levels, but per capita income levels of the two groups are no
longer equal to each other. More specically, we let the elites have a per capita income level of Y + ,
and the citizens have a per capita income level of Y   , where Y >  > 0. We name  as our measure of
income inequality.
12a. Elites in Power
First, consider the case where the elites are in power. The main assumptions are:
Y A = Y + ; Y B = Y    and A < B
In this setting, Propositions 1-3 continue to hold, and additionally we get Propositions 5-7 on the eects
of the inequality measures on the investment decision:
Proposition 5. When the elites are in power and there is political instability, a higher level of political
inequality leads to lower investment in state capacity.
Proof. See Appendix A.
As in Proposition 4, if there is political instability, then the elites choose to redistribute the resources in
the current period rather than using the resources to invest in state capacity. First, since the elites hold
the greater share of the total income, the expected benet of raising higher tax revenues in the second
period is low, which lowers the group's incentive to expand the tax base. Second, when the elites value
the benets of their group more and they are likely to lose the political power in the second period, it is
optimal to take advantage of the collected resources in the rst period and redistribute immediately.
Proposition 6. When the elites are in power, as income inequality increases investment in state capacity
decreases.
Proof. See Appendix A.
When income inequality is high, the elites hold a greater part of the total income. They choose to invest
less in expanding the tax base for two reasons. First, the amount of resources that they can collect from
the citizens is limited. Therefore, they nd it more protable to redistribute the resources immediately,
rather than building on state capacity in the rst period. Second, an increased tax base translates into
a higher loss of income by the elites, if they lose power to the citizens in the second period. Mainly due
to the fear of being taxed at a higher rate in the second period, the elites use the collected resources for
immediate redistribution and invest less in state capacity.
Proposition 7. When the elites are in power, higher income inequality reduces the positive eect of
political stability on investment in state capacity.
13Proof. See Appendix A.
In Proposition 3, we stated that greater political stability increases the government's incentive to invest
in state capacity. However, since income inequality has an adverse eect on the investment decision, it
decreases the positive impact of political stability. As income inequality increases, the tax revenues that
the elites can collect from the citizens become more limited. Therefore, the expected benet from investing
in state capacity decreases, which reduces the elites' incentive to expand the tax base.
b. Citizens in Power
Now, consider the case where the citizens are the ruling group. The above assumptions change as:
Y A = Y   ; Y B = Y +  and A > B
Propositions 1-4 and 7 continue to hold, but we see some changes in Propositions 5 and 6.
Proposition 8. When the citizens are in power, there is political instability and income inequality is low,
higher political inequality leads to lower investment in state capacity. However, if income inequality is
high, then higher political inequality leads to higher investment in state capacity.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 9. When the citizens are in power and political inequality is low, higher income inequality
decreases investment in state capacity. However, if political inequality is high, then higher income inequality
increases investment in state capacity.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Propositions 8 and 9 state that the eects of the inequality measures on the investment decision depend
mainly on the interactions between them. We will elaborate more on these propositions in the next
subsection.
3.3 Numerical Comparative Statics
To illustrate the propositions of the previous subsection, and more specically, to shed light on the con-
ditional results presented in Propositions 8 and 9, we simulate the optimality condition, or the OPT
equality. Our aim is to see how the level of investment in state capacity changes as  ,  and  vary. First,
14we generate two initial benchmarks (one for each group running the government), where there is positive
investment in state capacity. The calibration for the benchmarks is explained in detail below. Then, we
let the political stability and the inequality measures vary, in order to illustrate the results presented in
the propositions.
We set the population share of the elites to 20 percent. The average per capita income level is normalized
to unity. We let  to be a stochastic variable with truncated normal distribution on the interval [0;5],
with mean 0 and standard deviation 1.2. The value of public goods in the rst period 1 is 1.
We assume that, when the elites are in power, the total weights of the groups in the utility function are
chosen to be close to the income shares, A 
AY A
AY A+BY B and B 
BY B
AY A+BY B. That is, there is
some political inequality. We further assume that the top quantile in the population, the elites, get 40
percent of the total income. Therefore, when the elites rule, A is assigned a value close to this level (the
exact value that we set is 0.34, which makes B equal to 0.66). Then,  becomes 1.72 and  becomes
0.82, which gives a political inequality measure   of 0.9. Using the assumed population and income shares
of the two groups, we calculate the consistent income inequality measure , which is 0.45. With these
parameter values, the probability of being in the common interest state in the second period [1   H()]
becomes 0.15.
When the citizens are in power, we arbitrarily set the total utility weight for citizens A to be 0.94, which
is greater than the group's population share of 0.8. Holding   equal to 0.9,  and  become 1.18 and 0.28,
respectively. The inequality measure  stays as 0.45, since we continue to assume that the top quantile in
the population, the elites, get 40 percent of the total income. With these parameter values, the probability
of being in the common interest state in the second period [1   H()] turns out to be 0.33. See Table 1
for the summary of all parameter values used in the benchmarks.
Next, we let the political stability and the inequality measures vary. First, consider the eect of political
inequality on state capacity investment. In Proposition 5, we stated that, when the elites are in power,
in the presence of political instability and income inequality, higher political inequality leads to lower
investment in state capacity. This result is illustrated in Figure 1-a. As the political system becomes less
democratic, that is, as the value of   increases, the probability of being in the redistribution state H()
increases. In turn, the elites can denitely benet from collecting higher tax revenues in the second period
by increasing the tax base. But, given the presence of political instability, the citizens may take advantage
of the increased stock of state capacity and tax the elites at higher rates, if they gain power in the second
period. The elites become more concerned about the the second period outcome, due to the fear of being
15Table 1: Parameter Values and Results
Parameter Name Description Value - Elites (Citizens)
A Population share of group A 0.20 (0.80)
B Population share of group B 0.80 (0.20)
Y = Y A+Y B
2 Mean income 1.00
1 Value of public goods in period 1 1.00
 Upper bound of 2 5.00
  Level of political inequality 0.90
 Level of income inequality 0.45
 Political stability constant for group A 0.19 (0.79)
!A GDP Share for group A 0.40 (0.60)
!B GDP Share for group B 0.60 (0.40)
 Political weight for group A 1.72 (1.18)
 Political weight for group B 0.82 (0.28)
A Total weight for group A 0.34 (0.94)
B Total weight for group B 0.66 (0.06)
[1   H()] Probability of the common interest state 0.15 (0.33)
 Mean of alpha 0.00
 Std. of alpha 1.20
taxed at higher rates later as the income gap between the two groups increases. Overall, from the elites'
point of view, with higher income inequality and political instability, the current cost of investing in state
capacity is higher than the expected benet from higher tax rates in the second period. As a result, the
level of state capacity stays low, even under a more democratic system as reected by the downward shift
in the investment curve with higher income inequality. Also, as income inequality increases the slope of
the investment curve becomes steeper. Therefore, when the elites are in power, income inequality seems
to amplify the negative eect of political inequality on the investment decision.
As a second exercise, we drop the political instability assumption, and consider the extreme case of full
political stability, corresponding to  = 1. As shown in Figure 1-b, for lower levels of income inequality,
the eect of political inequality on the investment decision is positive. Given political stability, the elites
choose to invest in expanding the tax base, in order to be able to tax the citizens at higher rates in the
second period. However, as income inequality increases, the elites' incentive to invest in state capacity is
reduced, since the citizens hold only a very small portion of the total income. Then, at very high levels of
income inequality, it is optimal for the elites to redistribute the collected tax revenues immediately.
Third, we hold the level of income inequality constant at  = 0:45, and vary the value of the political
stability variable. As shown in Figure 1-c, as long as there is political instability, higher political inequality
leads to lower investment in state capacity. This is mainly due to the elites' fear of being taxed at higher
16Figure 1: Elites - Political Inequality
17rates in the second period, if the citizens become the ruler. As the level of political stability increases,
the investment curve becomes less steep, showing that the positive eect of political stability reduces the
negative eect of political inequality on the investment decision. Therefore, even when the elites are in
power, a more democratic political system, which is also stable, can lead to higher investment in state
capacity.
Next, consider the eect of political inequality on the investment decision when the citizens are in power.
Figure 2-a shows that, when there is political instability, at low levels of income inequality, political
inequality has a negative eect on investment in state capacity (Proposition 8). Note that, when there is
no income inequality, that is, when  = 0, the two groups become identical, and the citizens behave just like
the elites do. However, when income inequality is high, the citizens choose to invest more in state capacity
as the political system becomes less democratic. As political inequality   increases, it is more likely that
the world will be in the redistribution state in the second period, since H() also increases. Then, the
citizens would like to tax the elites at a higher rate to redistribute the resources amongst themselves. As
income inequality increases, the slope of the investment curve becomes steeper, due to the increasing rate
at which they benet from redistribution.
When there is full political stability, for all levels of income inequality, investment in state capacity increases
as the citizens favor their group more, or as political inequality increases. Figure 2-b displays that the
investment curve becomes steeper as income inequality increases. Since the citizens hold only a small
portion of the total income at a high level of income inequality, they have a higher incentive to tax the
elites at higher rates in the second period. Hence, given that there is full political stability, they invest
more in expanding the tax base.
While this result is very intuitive, it does not reect reality. In the case of many countries, even when the
government is run by the political groups favoring the citizens, we do not observe high levels of investment
in state capacity. Figure 2-c suggests an explanation for this observation. If we assume a reasonable level
of income inequality, say  = 0:45, the citizens choose to make investment in state capacity only when the
political system is stable. At low levels of political stability, investment in state capacity decreases with
higher political inequality. That is, when the citizens are less likely to be in power in the second period,
they choose to redistribute the tax revenues immediately, as many failed social revolutions have done in
the past.
Lastly, consider the eect of income inequality on state capacity investment. Proposition 6 states that
when the elites are in power, investment in state capacity decreases as income inequality increases. This
18Figure 2: Citizens - Political Inequality
19Figure 3: Citizens - Income Inequality
20result is robust to the changes in the levels of political inequality and stability. However, Figures 3-
a and 3-b display that, when the citizens are the ruling group the eect of income inequality on the
investment decision depends on the level of political inequality (Proposition 9). When the political system
is more democratic, the government becomes more utilitarian, and thus, it keeps the tax rates lower by not
increasing the stock of state capacity. But, as the citizens favor their own group, higher income inequality
calls for more redistribution. The cost of investment does not change, but a higher income gap between
the groups makes investment more protable from the citizens' point of view, since the amount to be
redistributed increases. Therefore, the citizens increase the stock of state capacity in the rst period, in
order to be able tax the elites at higher rates and transfer more resources to their own group members
in the second period. Note that, as the political system becomes less democratic, rst the slope of the
investment curve becomes less steep, then its sign changes. Under a highly undemocratic political system,
the value of   is high, which corresponds to a higher probability of being in the redistribution state H().
Since the redistribution motive is high, investment in state capacity increases. Even when there is no
political instability, the same result follows, as seen in Figure 3-b.
In order to understand the eect of political stability on the relationship between income inequality and
the investment decision, we x the level of political inequality   to 0.9. As shown in Figure 3-c, when the
citizens favor their group, higher income inequality leads to higher investment in state capacity. However,
political stability plays an important role as well. The stock of state capacity is higher when the political
system is more stable.
4 Empirical Analysis
So far, we have qualitatively determined the eects of ghting external wars and political stability, as
well as political and income inequality, on the decision of the government to invest in state capacity. We
summarize our theoretical results in Table 2.
Table 2: Summary of Theoretical Results
The Qualitative Eect of Each Determinant on Investment in State Capacity
2 (") 1 (")  (")   (")  (")
Benchmark - Elites Rule (") (#) (") (#) NA
Benchmark - Citizens Rule (") (#) (") (") NA
With Income Inequality - Elites Rule (") (#) (") (#) (#)
With Income Inequality - Citizens Rule (") (#) (") (#")* (#")*
Note:
* indicates that the sign depends on the interactions of the inequality measures.
21We stated that, if the country is more likely be involved in an external war, the government chooses to invest
more in state capacity.4 Intuitively, the government would like to raise funds to be able to pay for military
costs, and therefore increases the tax base by investing in state capacity. As for the inequality measures
and political instability, we showed that political instability and higher levels of political and/or income
inequality lead to lower investment in state capacity.5 If the political system is less democratic and/or
the distribution of income is unequal, the government's priorities are shifted towards redistributing the
tax revenues immediately, since the benet from redistribution in the rst period outweighs the expected
benet of collecting higher tax revenues in the second period.
In this section, we test the predictions of our model by applying econometric methods on cross-sectional
data.
4.1 Data
In our theoretical framework, we dened state capacity as the government's ability to raise tax revenues,
following the earliest denition of state capacity as in Tilly (1990). Accordingly, we use three dierent
tax measures to proxy for state capacity in the empirical analysis. Additionally, we relate state capacity
to state's bureaucratic quality in line with Hendrix (2009), and use two more proxies.6 Here is a brief
description of the ve measures of state capacity that we consider:
1. Total tax revenues: Annual average of total tax revenues, reported as percentage share in GDP, for the
periods 1980-2006 and 2000-2006. We use the data from Baunsgaard and Keen (2009), which is constructed
by using Government Finance Statistics (GFS) and IMF country documents.7 The initial sample contains
125 countries. We also include Mexico and Brazil in our sample and take the tax data for these countries
from the dataset used in Lora (2007).
2. Income tax revenues: Annual average of income tax revenues, reported as percentage share in GDP, for
the period 1980-2000. We use the dataset from Baunsgaard and Keen (2005), which is a previous version
of the one used in Baunsgaard and Keen (2009). We also add the data for Mexico and Brazil from Lora
(2007).
3. Domestic tax revenues: Annual average of GDP share of total tax revenues net of trade tax revenues,
4We actually state a more general result: a higher expected demand for public goods leads to higher investment in state
capacity. Fighting an external war is an example of a situation where the demand for public goods, such as defense, increases.
5Except for the case where the citizens are in power, as we discussed in detail previously.
6See Appendix B for the details of Hendrix (2009).
7The dataset was generously provided by Thomas Baunsgaard and Michael Keen.
22for the period 1980-2006. The resources for the dataset are the same as the ones used to construct the
dataset for total tax revenues.
4. Government eectiveness index: An index which represents one of the six dimensions of governance,
computed for the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) research project and reported in Kaufmann
et al. (2009).8 This particular index measures quality of public services, capacity of the civil service and
its independence from political pressures, as well as quality of policy formulation. The index values are
computed for every year since 1996, and range between -2.5 and 2.5, where a higher value indicates a
more eective government. We use the averages of all the values available for each country, for the periods
1996-2008 and 2002-2008.9
5. Ease of doing business ranking: A ranking of the countries according to the Ease of Doing Business
category of the Doing Business Project of the World Bank.10 We use the 2009 version of the dataset, which
covers rankings for 181 countries. We modify the rankings, so that each country takes a value between 0
and 1, where the country that is ranked as the best in terms of ease of doing business has a value of 1.
As for the possible determinants of state capacity, we use the following data:
1. Incidence of external wars: We construct a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the country has
been involved in an external war in a given year, and 0 otherwise. We use the denitions and the data from
the Correlates of War database.11 We dene incidence as the fraction of the years that the country has
been involved in an external war for two time periods: 1900-1975 (or since independence if this occurred
after 1900) and 1960-1997. Thus, our variable goes from 0 to 1, where a country that has been engaged
in an external war in all years in the sample has a value of 1. This measure proxies for  used in the
theoretical model.
8See Appendix B for further details.
9The denitions and the data are available online at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/.
10The data can be found at http://www.doingbusiness.org/. For each economy, the index is calculated as the ranking on
the simple average of its percentile rankings on each of the following 10 topics: Starting a business, dealing with construction
permits, employing workers, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders,
enforcing contracts and closing a business.
11The original data can be reached online at http://correlatesofwar.org/. In the data, there are two variables that refer to
external conict: interstatewar and extrastatewar. To be classied as an interstate war, at least two participants in sustained
combat should qualify as members of the interstate system and there should be at least 1,000 battle related fatalities among
all of the system members involved. A state involved is regarded as a participant if it incurs a minimum of 100 fatalities
or has 1,000 armed personnel engaged in ghting. Extrastate wars are wars between a state and a non-state entity. To be
classied as an extrastate war, at least one major participant in the conict (however irregular and disorganized) should not
be a member of the state system and there should be at least 1,000 battle related fatalities in every year for each of the
state participants. The year for which either of the two or both are equal to unity is counted as a year that the country has
been involved in an external war. Also, see the discussion of democracy variables for the matching procedure with modern
countries. The Correlates of War data report countries that have involved in civil wars or internal disputes in other polities
(e.g., European powers that were involved during the Russian civil war after the end of World War I). The data reported here
exclude foreign countries from the denition of civil wars.
232. Political Instability/Stability: We use two dierent measures. The rst one is incidence of civil wars,
which proxies for political instability (corresponding to (1   )), since the risk of civil war increases with
political instability (Hegre et al. (2001), Fearon and Laitin (2003), and Blattman and Miguel (2010)) and
the government is likely to be overthrown as a result of a civil war. We construct a dummy variable that
takes a value of 1 if the country has been involved in an internal war that took place in its own territory
in a given year, and 0 otherwise.12 Again, our dataset comes from the Correlates of War. Incidence is
then dened as the fraction of the years from 1900 to 1975, and from 1960 to 1997, that the country has
been engaged in an internal war, reported only for the time period that the country has been independent
since 1900. The result is a variable that goes from 0 to 1, where 1 represents that the country has been
in an internal war in all years in the sample. Our second proxy is the Political Stability and Absence of
Violance/Terrorism index computed for the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) research project and
reported in Kaufmann et al. (2009).13 It is constructed to `capture perceptions of the likelihood that the
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-
motivated violence and terrorism.' Higher index values indicate more stable political environments (higher
). We use the data for 1998.14
3. Incidence of Democracy (Political equality): We assume that the political system is more equal if it
is more democratic (lower  ). We proxy for political equality with each country's Polity2 score in the
Polity IV database.15 The Polity2 score captures the regime authority on a spectrum of a 21-point scale
ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to 10 (consolidated democracy). The score is constructed by
calculating the dierence between the regime's democracy and autocracy scores for a given year. Since
we are interested in capturing the regimes that are likely to represent low levels of political inequality, we
dene a country to be democratic in a certain year, if the Polity2 score is greater than 3.16 As in the case
of the conict variables, we compute the fraction of the years that a country has a Polity2 score greater
than 3 for the period between 1900 and 1975 (or since independence if this occurred after 1900) and the
period between 1960 and 1999.17
12In order to be classied as a civil war, the central government should be actively involved in military action with eective
resistance for both sides and there should be at least 1,000 battle related deaths. In order to constitute as eective resistance,
both sides must have been initially organized for violent conict, or the weaker side must be able to inict upon the stronger
opponents at least ve percent of the number of fatalities it sustains. We add the additional territory restriction, because in
many cases some countries got involved in civil wars or internal disputes that took place in other polities (e.g., some European
powers were involved during the Russian civil war after the end of World War I).
13See Appendix B for the details on the construction of this variable.
14The averages for 1996 and 1998 are also used for the robustness check.
15The data can be accessed online at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
16We also use a second denition that considers a country to be democratic in a certain year if the Polity2 score is greater
than 0.
17Here we would like to add a note on how we match the country classications used in the Polity IV and Correlates of
War databases to that of the current countries. We rst take all the countries that currently exist and match them to their
equivalent country in the above mentioned datasets. We then match some of the current countries to their previous political
244. Gini coecient (Income inequality): Gini coecient for the total population of the country, which
proxies for  in our theory. We use the data from the 2008 World Income Inequality Database of the
United Nations University - World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER). The
data cover the time period 1867-2006, and include, in the more recent years, 186 countries. Reported gini
coecients come from surveys which can dier greatly, in ten dimensions, such as area (e.g., national,
rural, urban, metropolitan areas, cities, etc.), population group (e.g., all, workers, taxpayers, certain age
groups, etc.), unit of analysis (e.g., individual, household, etc.) and measure of economic conditions (e.g.,
income or expenditures). Given the heterogeneity in the original data, we use the gini measures derived
from national surveys covering all the population. If more than one observation per country/year meets
these criteria, then we choose the higher quality observation (based on a quality index included in the
database). Finally, if there are still several reported gini coecients for the same country and year, we
choose those with a common characteristic (among the remaining 7 dimensions) with more observations
in the original database. Our resulting data have information for 88 countries for the period 1890-1975,
and consist of 338 observations in total. From this dataset, we construct and use average gini coecients
for the periods 1900-1975 and 1960-1999.18
The descriptive statistics for the measures and the determinants of state capacity are presented in Table
C1 in Appendix C.
4.2 Empirical Results
We rst graphically present the cross-correlations between the measures and the determinants of state
capacity. The following three measures are used as proxies for state capacity in this exercise: GDP share
of total tax revenues (2000-2006), the government eectiveness index (2002-2008) and the ease of doing
business ranking (2009). The cross-correlations are plotted in Figures 4 and 5.
Democracy scores and incidence of external wars are positively correlated with each measure of state
capacity we consider. On the contrary, incidence of internal wars and gini coecients are negatively
correlated with the measures of state capacity. The data show that, countries with more democratic
entities, if the current country is clearly a continuation of the previous one. For example, Germany is matched to West
Germany and to the original German state classied in Polity IV and Correlates of War (the same is done with Ethiopia and
Vietnam-North Vietnam). Finally, if the current countries were part of a larger independent political entity before 1975, we
assign the polity2 and war indicators of the older country to the new ones. For example Czech and Slovak Republic are both
assigned the value of Czechoslovakia. The same procedure is applied to Bangladesh and Pakistan, and the countries that
originated from the USSR and Yugoslavia. Baltic countries and Serbia, that did exist before they were absorbed by the USSR
and Yugoslavia, are not matched to their historical equivalents.
18For 31 countries there is only one data point. The country with the maximum number of observations between 1900 and
1975 is the United States. The median country has 2 observations in that period.
25Figure 4: Cross Correlations - Measures of State Capacity vs. Determinants of State Capacity
26Figure 5: Cross Correlations (Cont.) - Measures of State Capacity vs. Determinants of State Capacity
political systems (less political inequality) and higher valuation of public goods (higher incidence of external
wars) have higher levels of state capacity. However, higher incidence of internal wars (higher political
instability) and higher levels of income inequality are related to lower levels of state capacity. This
empirical evidence is line with our earlier theoretical predictions.
Next, we move on to the results for the econometric analysis. Our primary empirical tests are based on
the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the following form:
SCi = 0 + ewExtWari + iwIntWari + polPolityi + giniGinii + "i (23)
where SCi is a measure of state capacity for country i. ExtWari and IntWari stand for incidence of
external and internal wars, respectively. As discussed earlier, we use incidence of internal wars as a proxy
for political instability. To check for the robustness of our results, in a second set of regressions, we replace
IntWari with PolStabi, which stands for the political stability and absence of violance/terrorism index.
Polityi measures incidence of democracy, which proxies for the level of political equality. Ginii is the gini
coecient, which measures the level of income inequality. Finally, " is an error term capturing all other
omitted factors, with E(") = 0 for all i.
27We are aware that there may be potential endogeneity and simultaneity problems. Our explanatory
variables may have been jointly determined with the dierent measures of state capacity, through channels
that our model fails to capture. We deal with these potential problems by measuring all explanatory
variables before the years when the proxies for state capacity are observed and measured.
We use the data from two dierent sample periods in the estimations. The rst sample considers a long-
run perspective, and the average values of the explanatory variables correspond to the period 1900-1975.
The purpose of the regressions using the long term sample is to see to what extent the historical levels
of democracy, inequality and wars have had an impact on the average values of state capacity, which are
measured after 1980. The second sample is constructed with more recent measures: average values of
the explanatory variables are calculated for the periods 1960-1997 and 1960-1999, while state capacity is
measured after 2000.
Table 3 reports the results for the rst set of regressions, where the long term data are used. The estimates
in Panel a indicate that countries with more democratic political systems have, on average, higher levels
of state capacity, compared to the countries with less democratic political systems. Quantitatively, a one
standard deviation increase in our measure of democracy is associated with a 4.1 percentage point increase
in GDP share of total taxes, and a 3.5 percentage point increase in GDP share of income taxes. A country
with a one standard deviation decrease in the level of political inequality has a 0.4 increase (in a scale
that ranges between -2.5 and +2.5) in the government eectiveness index, while the ease of doing business
ranking increases by 0.1 (in a scale ranging from 0 to 1).
As for incidence of external wars, we nd that countries that have spent more years ghting external wars
have higher state capacity. More precisely, a country with one standard deviation higher incidence of
external wars has 2.6 percentage points higher GDP share of total taxes, 2 percentage points higher GDP
share of income taxes, and 5.2 percentage points higher share of domestic taxes in total taxes. When we
use the non-scal proxies of state capacity, a one standard deviation increase in incidence of external wars
turns out to be associated with a 0.2 increase in the government eectiveness index, and a 0.1 increase in
the ease of doing business ranking.
The estimates in Table 3-a further indicate that countries engaged in internal wars have, on average, lower
state capacity. Since incidence of internal wars is used as the proxy for political instability, we conclude
that higher political instability is related to lower state capacity. Quantitatively, a one standard deviation
increase in incidence of internal wars corresponds to a 1.7 percentage point decrease in GDP share of
28Table 3: Determinants of State Capacity: Long-Run Perspective
a. Without Income Inequality
Tot. Taxes Inc. Taxes Dom. Taxes Government Ease of Doing
(% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of Tot.Taxes) Eectiveness Business
1980-2006 1980-2000 1980-2006 1996-2008 2009
Democracy 10.670*** 9.160*** 5.817 1.045*** 0.233***
1900-1975 (2.888) (2.561) (4.939) (0.228) (0.068)
External Wars 23.480*** 18.410** 46.870*** 1.914*** 0.580***
1900-1975 (8.638) (7.593) (11.470) (0.520) (0.150)
Internal Wars -13.020* -3.735 12.130 -1.516*** -0.501***
1900-1975 (7.498) (4.357) (11.390) (0.440) (0.144)
Constant 14.030*** 3.829*** 73.370*** -0.538*** 0.306***
(0.932) (0.606) (1.936) (0.086) (0.032)
Number of obs. 104 104 104 154 147
Adjusted R-sq. 0.520 0.562 0.234 0.473 0.427
b. With Income Inequality
Tot. Taxes Inc. Taxes Dom. Taxes Government Ease of Doing
(% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of Tot.Taxes) Eectiveness Business
1980-2006 1980-2000 1980-2006 1996-2008 2009
Democracy 7.864** 6.879** 7.327 1.145*** 0.288***
1900-1975 (2.985) (2.631) (5.910) (0.233) (0.088)
External Wars 28.970*** 22.320*** 40.380*** 1.866*** 0.542***
1900-1975 (9.038) (7.626) (14.080) (0.551) (0.182)
Internal Wars -14.270 -4.171 0.017 -2.244*** -0.583***
1900-1975 (9.712) (5.160) (11.020) (0.413) (0.192)
Ln of Gini 2.345 -0.876 3.408 -0.833** -0.054
1900-1975 (5.675) (4.059) (10.480) (0.381) (0.115)
Constant 6.585 7.668 63.280 2.771* 0.532
(21.830) (15.540) (40.140) (1.518) (0.450)
Number of obs. 67 67 67 80 78
Adjusted R-sq. 0.549 0.561 0.210 0.595 0.485
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses: * p < 0:1, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01.
29total taxes.19 A country with one standard deviation higher incidence of internal wars has its government
eectiveness index and ease of doing business ranking lower by 0.2 and 0.1, respectively.
These results generally hold when we also control for income inequality. However, as reported in Table
3-b, when state capacity is proxied with GDP share of total taxes, the statistically signicant relationship
between incidence of internal wars and state capacity is no longer observed.20 Nevertheless, we nd that
countries with more equal distribution of income are associated with higher levels of state capacity when
we use the government eectiveness index as the measure of state capacity.
Table 4 reports the regression results for the more recent measures. While the data for the measures of state
capacity are for the 2000s, the data for democracy and inequality are for the period 1960-1999, and the
data for external wars are for the period 1960-1997. GDP share of total taxes, the government eectiveness
index and the ease of doing business ranking are used as the proxies for state capacity. We replace incidence
of internal wars with the political stability and absence of violance/terrorism index (1998). So, our focus
changes from the eect of political instability to the eect of political stability on state capacity. The basic
results, presented in columns 1, 5 and 9 of Table 4, show that democracy is positively correlated with the
recent measures of state capacity. Similarly, the coecient estimate of the political stability index is highly
signicant and positive, reassuring that political stability is an important element of stronger states.21
While these results support the conclusions drawn from the previous regressions, there are some dierences
as well. First, the positive correlation between incidence of external wars and state capacity vanishes in
the case of GDP share of total taxes (shown in column 1), suggesting that external conict no longer plays
the role (on taxation) it had played in the earlier part of the 20th century. Second, the results in columns
2, 6 and 10 of Table 4 show that income inequality is highly negatively correlated with state capacity in
the recent time period (except for case of GDP share of total taxes).
We also introduce two new terms corresponding to the interaction of income inequality with political
equality (ln of the gini coecient and incidence of democracy), and the interaction of income inequality
with political stability (ln of the gini coecient and the political stability index). The coecient estimates
of the two interacted terms are both negative and signicant, when GDP share of total taxes and the
19The statistically signicant relationship between incidence of internal wars and state capacity is no longer observed when
we use the other two scal proxies.
20The problem that we face when we include the gini coecient as an additional regressor is the loss of some of our
observations. We use between 104 and 154 observations for the set of regressions for the benchmark model. The number of
observations we can use decreases to a number between 67 and 80, when we add the gini as an additional explanatory variable.
This reduction in the sample size may be responsible for the insignicance of some of our results.
21We repeat the analysis by using the averages for the political stability variable for 1996 and 1998. Our results are robust
to this change. The corresponding estimation results are available upon request.
30government eectiveness index are used to proxy for state capacity (shown in columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 of
Table 4). In the case of the rst interacted term, the estimation results indicate that income inequality
reduces the magnitude of the positive correlation between democracy and state capacity, which is line with
the prediction of our theory (Proposition 7). Similarly, the negative signicance of the second interacted
term shows that, in the presence of income inequality, the positive correlation between political stability
and state capacity is dampened.
In the last set of regressions, we use the recent measures, but proxy political instability with incidence of
internal wars as in the long term regressions. The results are reported in Table 5. In line with our previous
results, we nd that countries with higher democracy scores and higher incidence of external wars (except
for the case of GDP share of total taxes) have higher state capacity.
Moreover, income inequality has a signicant negative correlation with all of the measures of state capacity
as shown in columns 2, 6 and 10 of Table 5. In the case of wars, our results indicate that internal wars
have a signicant and negative correlation with all of the measures of state capacity in the recent time
period. Therefore, internal wars, rather than external, are more important in explaining the dierences in
state capacity across countries when state capacity is proxied with GDP share of total taxes.22
We continue to include the interacted terms, which capture the interaction of income inequality with
democracy and incidence of internal wars (used as a proxy for political instability, rather than political
stability). As in the previous regressions, the results in columns 3, 7 and 11 of Table 5 show that income
inequality leads to a reduction in the positive correlation between democracy and state capacity (except for
the case of ease of doing business ranking). On the contrary, the coecient estimate of second interacted
term is signicant and positive in all regressions (in columns 4, 8 and 12 of Table 5), since both income
inequality and political instability are negatively correlated with state capacity. In other words, in the
presence of income inequality, the negative correlation of internal wars with state capacity, or the positive
correlation of political stability with state capacity is reduced.23
22These results support the panel estimations results in C ardenas and Eslava (2010). They nd that incidence of internal
wars, rather than incidence of external wars, is the key driver for the changes in state capacity.
23The results reported in Tables 3-5 are robust to using the alternative denition of democracy, which considers a country
to be democratic in a certain year, if the Polity2 score is greater than 0. The corresponding estimation results are available
upon request.
31Table 4: Determinants of State Capacity: Recent Measures, Interactions of Inequalities and an Alternative Measure of Political Instability
Total Taxes (% of GDP) Government E. Index Ease of Doing Buss. Rank
2000-2006 2002-2008 2009
Democracy 8.453*** 5.072* 104.100** 4.144 0.755*** 0.711*** 4.455** 0.700*** 0.219*** 0.259*** 0.072 0.260***
1960-1999 (2.609) (2.603) (43.120) (2.552) (0.171) (0.194) (1.898) (0.192) (0.066) (0.074) (0.695) (0.074)
External Wars 4.083 -2.192 2.627 -0.358 1.430*** 1.259** 1.324** 1.331*** 0.377** 0.282 0.278 0.278
1960-1997 (7.649) (8.429) (8.849) (7.464) (0.485) (0.482) (0.509) (0.485) (0.171) (0.184) (0.186) (0.188)
Political Stability 3.863*** 5.096*** 4.246*** 48.230*** 0.545*** 0.509*** 0.490*** 1.718** 0.124*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.047
1998 (0.977) (1.215) (1.365) (15.250) (0.063) (0.077) (0.082) (0.713) (0.022) (0.029) (0.029) (0.361)
Ln. of Gini - -6.725 8.881 -6.021 - -1.095*** -0.585* -1.071*** - -0.201** -0.226* -0.202**
1960-1999 (4.535) (7.502) (4.541) (0.202) (0.302) (0.200) (0.079) (0.116) (0.081)
Dem.*Ln.Gini - - -26.000** - - - -0.995** - - - 0.050 -
1960-1999 (11.340) (0.497) (0.186)
Pol.St.*Ln.Gini - - - -11.580*** - - - -0.330* - - - 0.015
1998 (4.016) (0.198) (0.098)
Constant 15.240*** 42.990** -17.470 39.580** -0.388*** 3.824*** 1.871 3.699*** 0.324*** 1.076*** 1.172*** 1.082***
(1.408) (17.320) (28.880) (17.370) (0.097) (0.787) (1.194) (0.784) (0.038) (0.299) (0.447) (0.312)
Number of obs. 107 93 93 93 159 131 131 131 152 129 129 129
Adjusted R-sq. 0.536 0.573 0.604 0.604 0.671 0.757 0.762 0.759 0.543 0.564 0.561 0.561
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses: * p < 0:1, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01.
3
2Table 5: Determinants of State Capacity: Recent Measures and Interactions of Inequalities - Political Instability Proxied with Internal Wars
Total Taxes (% of GDP) Government E. Index Ease of Doing Buss. Rank
2000-2006 2002-2008 2009
Democracy 12.240*** 9.833*** 131.600*** 9.232*** 1.305*** 1.184*** 7.111*** 1.131*** 0.341*** 0.355*** 0.658 0.329***
1960-1999 (2.552) (2.394) (43.620) (2.449) (0.194) (0.188) (2.262) (0.189) (0.060) (0.061) (0.694) (0.059)
External Wars 8.650 2.203 7.443 1.942 1.925*** 1.722*** 1.802*** 1.812*** 0.494*** 0.378** 0.382** 0.422***
1960-1997 (8.651) (8.495) (8.174) (8.299) (0.601) (0.428) (0.399) (0.436) (0.165) (0.165) (0.168) (0.157)
Internal Wars -18.270*** -18.840*** -16.840*** -280.000** -1.406*** -1.116*** -1.068*** -19.510*** -0.325*** -0.243* -0.240* -9.563***
1960-1997 (4.455) (4.900) (5.262) (128.700) (0.301) (0.263) (0.273) (6.880) (0.103) (0.128) (0.131) (3.090)
Ln. of Gini - -9.854** 10.190 -13.060** - -1.433*** -0.601 -1.633*** - -0.271*** -0.229** -0.376***
1960-1999 (4.709) (7.883) (5.124) (0.260) (0.381) (0.272) (0.079) (0.116) (0.079)
Dem.*Ln.Gini - - -32.240*** - - - -1.583*** - - - -0.081 -
1960-1999 (11.700) (0.601) (0.188)
Int.W.*Ln.Gini - - - 68.360** - - - 4.855*** - - - 2.460***
1960-1997 (33.300) (1.804) (0.821)
Constant 14.150*** 53.180*** -23.920 65.500*** -0.680*** 4.853*** 1.685 5.604*** 0.260*** 1.292*** 1.133** 1.683***
(1.218) (18.130) (30.100) (19.770) (0.100) (1.027) (1.489) (1.071) (0.036) (0.304) (0.446) (0.307)
Number of obs. 107 93 93 93 159 131 131 131 152 129 129 129
Adjusted R-sq. 0.523 0.532 0.587 0.548 0.521 0.650 0.664 0.662 0.456 0.513 0.510 0.556
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses: * p < 0:1, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01.
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35 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the economic and political factors that shape the government's decision to invest
in state capacity. We showed that political stability and equality are the building blocks of stronger states.
While political stability calls for higher investment in state capacity, political and income inequality lead
to lower investment. In line with existing literature, we presented that wars, whether external or internal,
are important determinants as well. While external wars result in higher state capacity, civil wars lead to
weaker states.
Our empirical analysis conrmed that countries with more democratic political systems and lower income
inequality are associated with higher state capacity. We found that more stable governments (whether
measured with the lower incidence of internal wars or higher political stability index) have higher state
capacity. Our results further indicate that the magnitudes of the positive correlations of democracy and
political stability with state capacity are signicantly reduced with higher income inequality. To conclude,
high political and/or income inequality, absence of external wars and high political instability (or the
presence of common and long-lasting civil wars) stand out as the main reasons why some governments
under-invest in state capacity.
While we have taken important steps to contribute to the recently growing literature on various dimensions
of state capacity, we believe that there are many theoretical and empirical issues, which deserve further
attention. For example, by using a two-period model, we abstracted from the possible dierences in the
short-run and the long-run investment decisions of the government. We assumed that the level of political
inequality is exogenously determined. This assumption can be relaxed and the model can be improved by
considering a dynamic multi-period version, where investment in state capacity, provision of public goods
and the representativeness of the political system are simultaneously determined by the government. While
we assumed the investment and public goods provision decisions to be dependent on political stability, the
causality can go in the opposite direction as well. Finally, civil wars can be re-dened as the rebellious
movements by the citizens, which occur when they nd the government policies to be unsatisfactory, in
terms of redistribution, the level of the provision of public goods and political representation. Such an
approach may bring more insight to the trade-os faced by the government, as well as the consequences
of dierent political and scal policies.
Empirically, it would be worthwhile to re-investigate the eects of the interactions between political and
income inequality on state capacity, when dierent income/political groups run the government. On this
issue, our theory predicts dierent results depending on the group in power (elites and citizens). In the
34data, grouping governments according to their political stance, such as the right wing and the left wing,
may be one way to represent such a distinction. It then becomes an empirical challenge to analyze the
eects of the interactions of the inequality measures on the government's decision to invest in state capacity.
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Appendix A - Proofs of Propositions 4-9
Proof of Proposition 4. Using the denition of political inequality,   =     and the constraint,
A + B = 1, we can re-write the weighting parameters as  = 1 +  B, and  = 1    A. Then we
can express the OPT equality in Equation (22) as:
OPT : (1)F0(4) =










1   H(1 +  B)
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A + (1    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which is negative when we also assume   A. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Having dened the the per capita income levels with the measure of income
inequality, we can re-write the OPT equality in Equation (24) as:
OPT : (1)F0(4) =

1   H(1 +  B)

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which is negative when   A is assumed. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Taking the derivative of the OPT equality in Equation (26) with respect to 
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which is negative. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Taking the derivative of the OPT equality in Equation (26) with respect to 
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which is negative, assuming F000(4) = 0. Previously, we derived
@(4)
@() > 0 and concluded that the eect
of political stability on state capacity investment decision is positive. The negative sign associated with
the above second derivative shows that, as income inequality increases, the positive impact of political
stability on the investment decision decreases. 
Proof of Proposition 8. Using the new assumptions (for the case of the citizens), we re-write the OPT
equality in Equation (22) and take its derivative with respect to  :
OPT : (1)F0(4) =

1   H(1 +  B)

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Note that it is not possible to tell the sign of the derivative analytically. When we assume   A, for low
levels of income inequality, higher political inequality leads to lower investment in state capacity. However,
when the level of income inequality is high, the sign of the derivative is likely to become positive. We can
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(32)
which is positive, assuming F000(4) = 0. Therefore, when the eect of political inequality is to lower the
38level of investment in state capacity, then higher income inequality reduces this eect. On the contrary,
if the impact of political inequality is positive on the investment decision, then higher income inequality
amplies this eect. 

















+2[1   H()] AB + H() 

B + (1   )A

(33)
Again, it is not possible to determine the sign of the derivative analytically. However, for low levels of
political inequality, the rst term is likely to cancel o the positive eect of the last terms. Therefore, we
conclude that for low levels of political inequality, higher income inequality leads to lower investment in
state capacity. However, when the level of political inequality is high, the eect of income inequality on
the investment decision is likely to have the opposite sign. The eect of political inequality on the impact
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(34)
which is positive, assuming F000(4) = 0. Therefore, when the eect of income inequality on the level of
investment in state capacity is in the negative direction, higher political inequality reduces this eect. On
the contrary, if the impact of income inequality is positive on the investment decision, then higher political
inequality amplies this eect. 
Appendix B - Additional Details on the Data
1. Measures of State Capacity:
The term `state capacity' has been widely used in the political science, sociology, and more recently in
the economics literature. The interpretation varies. According to Hendrix (2009), the use of the term can
be grouped into three categories. The rst one is military capacity, which represents the states ability
to overcome the rebellious actions against its authority with force. The proxies commonly used in this
category are military personnel per capita and military spending per capita. The second one is bureaucratic
and administrative capacity, which focuses on the professionalization of the state bureaucracy, its ability
39to protect property rights, and make credible commitments to private investors, as well as its ability
to raise revenue from the society. The popular measures used in this category consist of Political Risk
Services Groups International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), specically the measure that assesses the risk
of expropriation and repudiation of government contracts. This category also includes measures of scal
state capacity, such as GDP share of total taxes, share of income taxes in total taxes and share of domestic
(non-trade) taxes in total taxes. The third category is the quality and coherence of political institutions,
which considers the degree of interference between the democratic and nondemocratic features in the
political system. Studies in the civil war literature, such as Hegre et al. (2001), Fearon and Laitin (2003)
and DeRouen and Sobek (2004) use the Polity index to represent this concept of state capacity.
All the above mentioned measures of state capacity are highly collinear and endogenous, so it is appropriate
to select a few that are highly correlated with the others. Using factor analysis, Hendrix (2009) shows
that bureaucratic quality and GDP share of total taxes stand out as the most representative denitions
and measures of state capacity. In total, Hendrix uses 15 dierent and highly correlated measures of state
capacity including military personnel and expenditures (per capita), ICRGs measures of bureaucratic
quality and investment prole, GDP share of total taxes, GDP share of total revenue and the Polity2
index, among others. Using principal factor analysis to create a smaller set of measures that can account
for most of the variance in the 15 measures, he nds that, bureaucratic quality and GDP share of total
tax revenues can explain cumulatively 90.6 percent of the variance in all the measures considered, with the
rst factor alone capturing 53.2 percent. In what follows, we focus on the bureaucratic and administrative
denitions of state capacity in our empirical analysis. We use ve dierent measures to proxy for state
capacity. The rst three measures (GDP share of total taxes, GDP share of income taxes, total tax share
of domestic taxes) are related to the state's ability to raise revenue from the public, while the remaining
two measures (government eectiveness index and ease of doing business ranking) represent the state's
bureaucratic quality.
2. Construction of the Political Stability and Absence of Violence Index:
Kaufmann et al. (2009) organize many individual sources of the data on governance perceptions and
assign them to these six broad categories: 1. Voice and Accountability, 2. Political Stability and Absence
of Violence, 3. Government Eectiveness, 4. Regulatory Quality, 5. Rule of Law, 6. Control of Corruption.
Then, they use an unobserved components model to construct aggregate indicators from these individual
measures.
The following data sources are used in the construction of the political stability and absence of violence
40index:
`A. Representative Sources: 1. BRI (Business Environment Risk Intelligence Business Risk Service /
Financial Ethics Index): a. Fractionalization of political spectrum and the power of these factions, b.
Fractionalization by language, ethnic and/or religious groups and the power of these factions, c. Restric-
tive (coercive) measures required to retain power, d. Organization and strength of forces for a radical
government, e. Societal conict involving demonstrations, strikes and street violence, f. Instability as
perceived by non-constitutional changes, assassinations and guerrilla wars; 2. DRI (Global Insight Global
Risk Service): a. Military coup risk, b. Major insurgency/rebellion, c. Political terrorism, d. Political
assassination, e. Civil war, f. Major urban riot; 3. EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit Riskwire and Democ-
racy Index): a. Armed conict, b. Violent demonstrations, c. Social unrest, d. International tensions;
4. GAD (Cerberus Intelligence Gray Area Dynamics): a. Autonomy and separatism, b. Civil unrest, c.
State of emergency/martial law, d. Active terrorist groups in the last two years; 5. GCS (World Economic
Forum Global Competitiveness Report): Country terrorist threat : Does the threat of terrorism in the
country impose signicant costs on rms? 6. HUM (Cingranelli Richards Human Rights Database and
Political Terror Scale): a. Frequency of political killings, b. Frequency of disappearances, c. Frequency of
torture; 7. IJT (iJET Country Security Risk Ratings): Security risk rating; 8. IPD (Institutional Proles
Database): a. Conicts of ethnic, religious, regional nature, b. Violent actions by underground political
organizations, c. Violent social conicts, d. External public security; 9. PRS (Political Risk Services
International Country Risk Guide): a. Internal Conict: Assesses political violence and its inuence on
governance, b. External conict: The external conict measure is an assessment both of the risk to the
incumbent government and to inward investment, c. Government stability: Measures the governments
ability to carry out its declared programs and its ability to stay in oce, d. Ethnic tensions: This com-
ponent measures the degree of tension within a country attributable to racial, nationality or language
divisions; 10. PTS (Political terror scale); 11. WMO (Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indi-
cators): a. Civil unrest: How widespread political unrest is and how great a threat it poses to investors,
b. Terrorism: Whether the country suers from a sustained terrorist threat and from how many sources.'
`B. Non-representative Sources: 1. AEO (OECD Development Center African Economic Outlook): Civil
tensions, b. WCY (Institute for Management and Development World Competitiveness Yearbook): Risk
of political instability.'
41Appendix C - Additional Tables
Table C1: Descriptive Statistics
Measures of State Capacity
Obs. Mean Std. Min. Max. 25th Percentile 75th Percentile Period Covered
Total Taxes (% of GDP) 127 20.63 10.52 1.86 51.43 13.12 27.02 1980-2006
Total Taxes (% of GDP) 127 20.83 10.84 2.97 51.00 12.67 27.65 2000-2006
Income Taxes (% of GDP) 127 8.64 8.53 0.00 37.30 2.61 11.44 1980-2000
Dom. Taxes (% of Tot. Taxes) 127 77.04 17.56 32.16 99.71 65.19 93.57 1980-2006
Government E. Index 210 0.01 0.98 -2.10 2.29 -0.70 0.71 1996-2008
Government E. Index 210 0.01 0.99 -2.12 2.27 -0.70 0.70 2002-2008
Ease of Doing Bus. Ranking 181 0.50 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.75 2009
Determinants of State Capacity
Obs. Mean Std. Min. Max. 25th Percentile 75th Percentile Period Covered
Democracy (Polity2 > 3)(% of Years) 156 0.27 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.41 1900-1975
Democracy (Polity2 > 3)(% of Years) 161 0.35 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.60 1960-1999
Democracy (Polity2 > 0)(% of Years) 156 0.33 0.39 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.68 1900-1975
Democracy (Polity2 > 0))(% of Years) 161 0.38 0.38 0 1.00 0.00 0.66 1960-1999
External Wars (% of Years) 156 0.07 0.11 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.12 1900-1975
External Wars (% of Years) 161 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.03 1960-1997
Internal Wars (% of Years) 156 0.05 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.06 1900-1975
Internal Wars (% of Years) 161 0.08 0.16 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.04 1960-1997
Gini (Averages) 88 42.12 9.91 18.42 63.70 33.78 49.50 1900-1975
Gini (Averages) 142 41.34 10.82 21.42 74.33 32.34 49.07 1960-1999
Political Stab. & Absence of Violence/Terrorism 190 -0.09 0.98 -2.60 1.48 -0.69 0.66 1996 & 1998
Political Stab. & Absence of Violence/Terrorism 180 -0.11 1.01 -2.80 1.46 -0.72 .75 1996
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2